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THE IN/INTO CONTROVERSY: LUBET MISSES
THE POINT
. Alexander Tanford*
In his controversial article "Into Evidence,"' Steve Lubet be-
moans the fact that all Trial Advocacy professors essentially agree
with each other. This lack of professional controversy, he asserts,
makes us all wretched.2 In this, his latest attempt to foment contro-
versy,3 Lubet argues that exhibits are admitted into evidence, rather
than in evidence.4 Although I agree with him on both counts, I don't
see why that should stand in the way of a good argument. The prob-
lem with his thesis is that he has completely missed the point.
Lubet's article is a post-modern critique of Peter Murray's infa-
mous footnote, in which Murray asserts that evidence is not a place
but a status.5 Lubet attacks this formalist view through deconstruc-
tion, using the tool of grammatical analysis borrowed from the faddish
law-and-literature movement. Unfortunately, Lubet gets so caught up
in this intellectual exercise that he fails to see the forest for the trees.
He overlooks the central flaw of Murray's footnote: When used in the
context of exhibits, "evidence" is neither a place nor a status, it is a
euphemism for "the record." Once we agree on that, then it is obvi-
ous that information (such as an exhibit) is placed into the record;
hence, into evidence. Lubet thus commits the cardinal sin of scholarly
discourse-he is right but for the wrong reason!
Let us examine the issue further.
The primary source of the problem is, of course, the ambiguity of
meaning. 6 What is "evidence"? Until this question is answered, it is
pointless to explore the in/into question. Unfortunately, evidence is
not defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Indeed, the drafters of
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1 Steven Lubet, Into Evidence, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 154 (1995).
2 1 am writing this while watching 21 videotaped final trials in which not a single student was
able competently to get an exhibit either in or into evidence. I am not at all sure it is the lack of
professional controversy that makes us this way.
3 See Lubet, supra note 1, at 155 n.12, in which he cites a number of his previous articles in a
shallow ploy designed to improve his citation count.
4 Or the other way around; I'm not quite sure.
5 P-R L. MURRAY, BASIC TEIAL ADVOCACY 14 n.1 (1995).
6 See DAVID TRACY, PLURALrTY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, REUGIOON, HOPE
(1989) (likely sounding book picked at random from library catalog).
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the Federal Rules of Evidence appear to have tried deliberately to
obfuscate this issue by writing incomprehensibly and butchering the
English language whenever possible. For example, the Rules refer to
"the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence."' 7 Turning
to Black's Law Dictionary,8 we find no help there either. It defines
evidence as a "species" of proof, which suggests that evidence is
neither status nor place, but some kind of living thing.
A second problem is that "there's law on both sides." Take the
Federal Rules of Evidence.9 They were drafted by a committee, and
therefore try to placate both the "in" and the "into" schools. Rule 612
provides that if a writing is used to refresh memory "an adverse party
is entitled.., to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to
the testimony of the witness." Rule 803(5), however provides that if
this same writing is used as a record of past recollection, it "may be
read into evidence." Similarly, Rule 703 provides that data relied on
by an expert "need not be admissible in evidence," while Rule 803(18)
provides that if this same data is contained in published treatises or
periodicals, "the statements may be read into evidence."
Case law also goes both ways. A Westlaw' ° search of federal ap-
pellate court opinions reveals that 15,622 cases prefer the phrase "into
evidence," 16,801 use the phrase "in evidence," and a staggering 4437
use both phrases in the same opinion."
One solution has been offered by the Indiana state courts. Sim-
ply eliminate the problem by declaring that exhibits are not admissible
at all! In Springer v. State,12 the Indiana Supreme Court held:
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evi-
dence a certain knife which was State's exhibit 8.... Wagner testified
that exhibit 8 was "exactly like" the knife Appellant used to stab him.
The knife used by Appellant in his attack was referred to repeatedly
throughout Appellant's trial. Photographs were introduced to show the
knife wounds caused by Appellant and Wagner showed the resulting
scars. The State... argues that State's exhibit 8 was demonstrative evi-
dence.., and therefore was admissible. We do not agree.... Although
7 FED. R. EVID. 104(e); see also FED. R. EVID. 104(b): "When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."
8 They made me buy BLACK's LAW DIC'TONARY when I was a 1-L in 1973. I have never
actually used it for anything.
9 Pleasel
10 My trial practice book is published by the Michie Company which owns LEXIS, Westlaw's
competitor. However, out of courtesy to my publisher, which would surely prefer not to be
associated with this article, I ran the search on Westlaw.
11 I really ran this search. I did not, however, actually read any of the cases. Reading cases
is not necessary in modem legal scholarship. See any recent issue of the Harvard, Yale, or
Stanford Law Review.
12 463 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1984).
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the trial court could have allowed exhibit 8 to be used at trial... the trial
court should not have formally admitted exhibit 8 into evidence.13
A better solution is to abandon the outdated notion that exhibits
begin outside the realm of evidence and end up inside it. Our starting
point is again the Federal Rules themselves. The Rules never say that
exhibits are admissible in or into evidence. Indeed, when exhibits and
admissibility arise, the language is surprisingly reminiscent of the Indi-
ana opinion. Rule 803(18) provides that if learned treatises are ad-
mitted, they "may not be received as exhibits." Likewise Rule 803(5),
which states that a record of past recollection "may be read into evi-
dence but may not itself be received as an exhibit."
The need to redefine exactly what kind of thing/status exhibits
are being admitted in/into, is made even more obvious when one con-
siders the linguistic ramifications of failing to do so. Consider Rule
404(b), which addresses "evidence [the prosecution] intends to intro-
duce at trial." If the Lubet/Murray thesis14 were correct, this phrase
would effectively read: "evidence [the prosecution] intends to intro-
duce in/into evidence"-an obvious redundancy and a disfavored
grammatical construction. How can evidence be introduced in/into
evidence? If it is evidence to begin with, it cannot be introduced in/
into itself-it is already there.15
Once we abandon the idea that the end product of introduction is
evidence, what exactly is evidence introduced in/into? The solution,
as always, lies with Wigmore. Wigmore's treatise is appropriately re-
ferred to as the Bible of Evidence-if you look hard enough, you can
find support in it for any proposition.16 Wigmore doesn't mess around
with trivial concepts like exhibits-he gets right to the heart of the
matter: we're talking here about "autoptic proference!"1 7 As Wig-
more himself states:
13 ld. at 245-46 (emphasis added). Given the court's holding, its decision to use the phrase
"into evidence" can only be considered dicta-or is it dictum?
14 For those who have lost the thread, Murray and Lubet are engaged in a scholarly disagree-
ment about whether exhibits are admitted in or into evidence.
15 A similar redundancy appears in the juxtaposition of FRE 103(b), which speaks of the
"character of evidence," and 404(a) which mentions "evidence of character." Does this mean
that an offer of proof under Rule 404 would have to show the character of the evidence of charac-
ter? I should think notl
16 E.g., compare 5 WIGMORE ON EVmENCE § 1367 at 32 (cross-examination is the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth) with 1 WIGMORE ON EviDENCE § 8 at 237
(cross-examination is the most "efficacious expedient" ever invented for the creation of false
impressions).
17 Book I, Part I, Title III of WoMORE ON EVIENCE, which covers "real" evidence such as
in-court experiments, weapons, bloody clothes, photographs, liquor sampled by jurors, the con-
duct of insane people, and jury views, is entitled "Autoptic Proferences." Interestingly, this
phrase has actually appeared in several appellate opinions, although not always in particularly
helpful ways. See the pithy insight of Rich v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 278 F.2d 704, 708
Lubet Misses
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The three modes by which a tribunal may properly acquire knowl-
edge for making its decisions ... are Circumstantial Evidence, Testimo-
nial Evidence, and "Real" Evidence.... If, for example, it is desired to
ascertain whether the accused has lost his right hand and wears an iron
hook in place of it,18 one source of belief on the subject would be the
testimony of a witness who had seen the arm; in believing this testimo-
nial evidence, there is an inference from the human assertion to the fact
asserted. A second source of belief would be the mark left on some
substance grasped or carried by the accused; in believing this circumstan-
tial evidence, there is an inference from the circumstance to the thing
producing it. A third source of belief remains, namely the inspection by
the tribunal of the accused's arm. This source differs from the other two
in omitting any step of conscious inference or reasoning, and in proceed-
ing by direct self-perception, or autopsy.... [F]or the purposes of judi-
cial investigation, a thing perceived by the tribunal as existing does
exist.... [W]e are here concerned with nothing more than matters di-
rectly perceived - for example, that a person is of small height1 9 or is of
dark complexion; as to such matters, the perception by the tribunal that
the person is small or large, or that he has a dark or a light complexion,
is a mode of acquiring belief which is independent of inference from
either testimonial or circumstantial evidence. It is the tribunal's self-per-
ception, or autopsy, of the thing itself.
From the point of view of the litigant party furnishing this source of
belief, it may be termed Autoptic Proference.20
It follows that, as soon as the jurors see an exhibit with their own
eyes, it has become part of the evidence they will consider2' in reach-
ing a verdict. The exhibit becomes evidence at this very moment of
(2d Cir. 1960) ("Autoptic proference is always proper, unless reasons of policy apply to exclude
it.").
18 Was this a major problem in Wigmore's day? I ran another Westlaw search, and found no
cases in which anyone cared whether the accused had lost his hand and had it replaced with an
iron hook.
19 An interesting turn of phrase. Perhaps Wigmore's manual of style omitted the section on
oxymorons.
20 4 WIOMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1150 at 322. Neither the word "autoptic" nor the word
"proference" appears in the AMERICAN HERiTAGE DICrIONARY (3d ed. 1992). Wigmore made
them up, noting somewhat opaquely that autoptic came from "autopsy," and proference derived
from the Latin proferre, "whose form 'profert' is intimately associated, in history and principle,
with the process of autoptic proference." Id. n.1. He did not further elaborate on this intimate
association. In any event, the dictionary suggests that the correct adjectival form of autopsy
would be "autopsic," not autoptic, and spells proffer with two f's, not one. It also points out that
"proffer" is already a noun (e.g., the proffer of evidence), so there is no reason to add the redun-
dant "-ence" to make it into a noun. Technically speaking, Wigmore's word "profference," even
if correctly spelled, would mean "the act of the act of bringing something forth." The redundancy
section also appears to have been missing from Wigmore's style manual.
21 That is, they will reject it along with other credible evidence, in order to decide the case
based on their pre-conceptions and/or messages received from God. See United States v. John
DeLorean (acquitted).
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autoptic proference! To speak further about entering the exhibit in/
into evidence is meaningless-it is already there.22
What is left? Once the exhibit has become evidence, the only
question remaining is, What happens to evidence when it has served
its primary purpose? The answer is obvious: it becomes part of the
record. For example, Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.2 states:
"The record of the proceedings shall consist of... [t]he transcript of
the evidence... [e]xhibits [and] physical objects." As every trial law-
yer knows, the whole reason we bother to call witnesses and offer ex-
hibits is to prepare a record for appeal. It is pointless to do this for
trial purposes, because the jurors already have made up their minds
based on what they heard at the laundromat months before the trial
even started.
Thus, it is plain to see that Lubet is right in pointing out that
Murray is wrong. Evidence is not a status in which exhibits are admit-
ted.2 3 However, it is also plain that Lubet is wrong himself when he
asserts that evidence is a place into which exhibits are introduced.
When used in the context of exhibits, "evidence" is neither a place nor
a status, it is a euphemism for "the record." Since a record containing
exhibits is customarily sent to the court of appeals in a box, it is obvi-
ous that exhibits are placed into that box; hence "into" the record. I
hope this puts the issue to rest.
22 See RiciHAn REOVALD, HEIDEGGER ET LE PROBLEME Du NEANT (1987); DAVID K. COE,
ANGST AND T-E ABYss: THE HERMENEUTncs OF NOTHINGNESS (1985); JEAN PAUL SARTRE,
BEING AND NOTHINGNESS; AN ESSAY ON PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY (Hazel E. Barnes
trans., 1968).
23 Besides, if evidence were a status, wouldn't exhibits be admitted to evidence, as Mother
Theresa will someday be elevated to sainthood?
Lubet Misses
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